

# Ying Wang

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## Education **Boston College**

Ph.D., Economics, 2019 - 2025 (Expected).

- Committee: Mehmet Ekmekci, Lucas Co man, Michael Grubb

- Comprehensive Exams Completed: Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Industrial Organization

## **London School of Economics and Political Science**

M.S., Economics, 2018.

- Advisor: John Sutton (Economics of Industry)

## **University of California, Berkeley**

B.A., Applied Mathematics, 2017.

Fields Applied Theory, Experimental Economics, Information Economics

## Working Papers **"Optimal Dynamic Feedback Design: Theory and Experiment" (JMP)**

This paper provides a theoretical and experimental analysis of informational and monetary incentive designs within a dynamic principal-agent framework. In the studied setting, the principal values the agent's effort but cannot observe it. Instead, the principal privately observes a signal contingent on the agent's effort, indicating the occurrence of a "success". The optimal contract withholds the information about the signal's arrival status until after a predetermined quiet period and is then fully transparent. The optimal reward for a success takes two values, high in the quiet period and low in the transparent period. An experiment examining how different information disclosure policies and monetary incentives affect participants' effort supports these theoretical predictions. The quiet period raises effort for agents who succeed early while the transparent period raises effort for agents who succeed late or never. The decreasing reward structure effectively deters shirking and encourages early-stage effort. Individual characteristics, such as risk preferences and gender, also significantly predicts participants' effort responses across treatments.

## **"Designing Dynamic Innovation Contests"**

Work **"Information Disclosure with Costly Monitoring"**  
In Progress

Work Department of Economics, Boston College  
Experience