

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WITH OVERLAPPING RESERVES

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ABSTRACT. Affirmative action policies provide a balance between meritocracy and equity in a wide variety of real-life resource allocation problems. We study choice rules where meritocracy is attained by prioritizing individuals based on merit, and equity is attained by reserving positions for target groups of disadvantaged individuals. Focusing on overlapping reserves, the case where an individual can belong to multiple target groups, we characterize choice rules that satisfy maximal compliance with reservations, elimination of justified envy, and non-wastefulness. When an individual accommodates only one of the reserved positions, the *horizontal envelope choice rule* is the only rule to satisfy these three axioms. When an individual accommodates each of the reserved positions she qualifies for, there are complementarities between individuals. Under this alternative convention, and assuming there are only two target groups, such as women and minorities, *paired-admissions choice rules* are the only ones to satisfy the three axioms. Building on these results, we provide improved mechanisms for implementing a variety of recent reforms, including the 2015 school choice reform in Chile and 2012 college admissions reform in Brazil.

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1. Introduction

While affirmative action remains to be a highly contested topic in the U.S., it has gained widespread acceptance in much of the world as public awareness of inequalities faced by various disadvantaged groups increased. As a result, affirmative action policies have been adopted worldwide in a variety of resource allocation problems, such as assignment of public school seats, government jobs, and legislative positions. Perhaps the most widely used class of affirmative action policies relies on reserving a certain fraction of seats for members of target beneficiary groups. In some applications, all items are identical, such as the allocation of legislative seats or decentralized admissions to a single university. In these applications, the outcome is determined through an (often rigorously defined) *choice rule*, which in general depends on the number of reserved seats for each target group, as well as other criteria such as a merit ranking of candidates (in applications such as allocation of school seats or assignment of government jobs) or the number of votes received by candidates (in applications such as allocation of legislative seats). These choice rules essentially capture policies which define the “property rights” over a set of homogenous indivisible goods. Hence, design of choice rules can be viewed as engineering of policies that govern allocation of these resources. In this paper, our focus is both the design and analysis of choice rules, as well as some of the direct policy implications of our results on three large-scale real-life applications from Chile, India, and Brazil.

While we extend our analysis to the more general case with heterogenous positions in Section 5, the starting point of our analysis is the more basic case with homogenous positions; i.e., the case where all the positions are identical. We consider affirmative action policies where the two main ingredients are, (1) an exogenous priority ranking of individuals, which would have solely dictated the choice of individuals in the absence of affirmative action, and (2) a number of reserved positions for each target group of individuals. Importantly, and deviating from much of the prior literature with a few exceptions, we allow each individual to be a member of multiple reserve-eligible target groups. That is, we consider the case of *overlapping reserves*, which has become increasingly widespread in real-life applications. For example, in Jordan and Pakistan there are reserved positions both for women and also for minorities for the seat allocation at their national assemblies (Htun, 2004).¹ All three applications presented in Section 6 also have this feature. In these applications, an individual who belongs to two target beneficiary groups, for example a minority woman, can benefit both from the reserved positions for women and reserved positions for minorities.

¹In Jordanian House of Representatives, of the 110 seats 6 are reserved for women and 12 are reserved for Christians and Chechens/Circassians. In Pakistani National Assembly, of the 342 seats 60 are reserved for women and 10 are reserved for minorities (Htun, 2004).

Our approach is axiomatic, and throughout the paper we focus on choice rules that satisfy three basic properties, each of which is highly plausible in this framework:

- (1) *Maximal compliance with reservations*: As many of the reserved positions as possible are to be allocated to the candidates from target groups.
- (2) *Elimination of justified envy*: A lower-priority candidate is not to be assigned a position at the expense of a higher-priority candidate, unless doing so enables channelling strictly higher number of the reserved positions to qualified candidates.
- (3) *Non-wastefulness*: All positions are to be allocated, to the extent there are sufficiently many candidates.

One distinction between various real-life implementations of overlapping reserves becomes critical for our modeling and analysis. Consider an individual who is a member of multiple reserve-eligible beneficiary groups. A key policy consideration is, whether an admission granted to this individual should count towards accommodating each one of the reserved positions she qualifies for, or only one of them. For example, suppose there is one position reserved for female candidates and one position reserved for minority candidates. When a minority woman is admitted, should her admission count towards accommodating both the women reserve as well as the minority reserve, or only one of them? Essentially, the distinction here is about the accounting convention adopted for enforcing reserves, and both conventions are observed in real-life applications. We refer to these two conventions as *one-to-all reserve matching* and *one-to-one reserve matching*, respectively.

While the choice of convention in enforcing reserves often depends on the specific application and it can be viewed as a policy decision, one of our main contributions is showing that it has important implications on the design. Even though either accounting convention brings its own challenges into design, adoption of the one-to-one reserve matching convention leads us to a much “cleaner” solution: Under this convention, the *horizontal envelope choice rule* introduced in Section 3 is the unique choice rule that satisfies non-wastefulness, maximal compliance with reservations, and elimination of justified envy (Theorem 1). Before elaborating on the intuition and details of this choice rule, it will be helpful to outline the challenges either convention brings into design.

Consider the one-to-all reserve matching convention, under which an individual upon admission counts towards each of the reserves she qualifies for. For example, admission of a minority woman counts towards accommodating both the women reserves and the minority reserves. The resulting challenge is well-known in the literature: Under this convention there are *complementarities* between various groups of individuals, which in general means admission of one of the individuals may hinge upon admission of another individual (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu (2005)). For example, there are complementarities between majority men and minority women when there are reserved seats both for women and

reserved seat for disabled candidates. Ironically, many real-life applications do not utilize the flexibility generated by candidates who qualify for multiple types of reserves, and thus suffer from the very shortcoming we illustrate in these two scenarios. For example, as we present in Section 6.1, the brand new school choice system in Chile suffers from this exact shortcoming, precisely for the reason we illustrate here. A better design would not give up the flexibility generated by candidates who qualify for multiple reserves, and instead capitalize on it. This is the basic idea under our proposed horizontal envelope choice rule. We argue that this choice rule is the only plausible choice rule under the one-to-one reserve matching convention, for it is the unique choice rule that satisfies fairly basic desiderata.

When the allocation problem involves heterogeneous goods, the design is more involved, because the system has to determine not only the set of recipients who receive an item, but also which recipient receives which item. Over the last couple of decades, the celebrated *agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm* (Gale and Shapley, 1962) has gained acceptance worldwide as the mechanism of choice for this purpose in different applications, including some with diversity constraints.⁴ Hence, it is natural to rely on the same approach in this framework as well. Analysis of the more general version of the problem with heterogeneous goods reveals another advantage of the accounting convention of one-to-one reserve matching, compared to one-to-all reserve matching. The *agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm* is well-behaved only if the choice rule used by each institution satisfies a technical condition known as the *substitutes* condition. While the horizontal envelope choice rule satisfies substitutability (Proposition 4), there is no choice rule that satisfies our three properties along with substitutability under the one-to-all reserve matching convention (Proposition 5).

The following summary of our main theoretical results is helpful to compare and contrast the two alternative conventions for enforcing reserves.

- (1) Under the one-to-one reserve matching convention:
 - (a) There is a unique choice rule, namely the horizontal envelope choice rule, that satisfies maximal compliance with reservations, elimination of justified envy,

- (2) Under the one-to-all reserve matching convention, and assuming there are only two target beneficiary groups:
- (a) A choice rule satisfies maximal compliance with reservations, elimination of justified envy, and non-wastefulness if, and only if, it is a selection from the *paired-admissions choice correspondence*.
 - (b) Presence of complementarities is reflected in the structure of selections from the paired-admissions choice correspondence: This class of choice rules has an optimal selection for individuals who are either members of both target groups or a member of neither target group. This selection is also pessimal for individuals who are members of only one of the target groups. Similarly, there is an optimal selection for individuals who are members of only one of the target groups, which is also the pessimal selection for individuals who are either members of both target groups or a member of neither target group.
 - (c) There is no selection from the paired-admissions choice correspondence that satisfies the substitutes condition. Therefore, of the choice rules that satisfy non-wastefulness, maximal compliance with reservations, and elimination of justified envy, none of them can be jointly implemented with the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm when items are heterogeneous.

Our results have direct policy implications for several real-life applications of affirmative action. Some of these policy implications, presented in Section 6, include:

- (1) Bringing into light two shortcomings of the recently designed school choice mechanism for Chile, as well as the design of an improved mechanism that complies with the 2015 School Inclusion Law,
- (2) bringing into light two shortcomings of a Supreme Court-mandated affirmative action procedure from India, as well as its unique improvement that satisfies our three axioms, and
- (3) the provision of a class of college admissions mechanisms for Brazil that complies with *The Law of Social Quotas*, without imposing any additional restrictions beyond

quotas, and regional quotas.⁵ What differentiates our paper from the others is the following four features:

- (1) Our focus is the analysis and design of affirmative action policies under overlapping reserves, a version of the problem that is neither well-understood nor analyzed.
- (2) In previous studies, which adopted the one-to-one reserve matching convention, individuals are either assumed to have strict preferences between reserved seats of different types (as in Aygün and Turhan (2016) and Kurata et al. (2017)) or their indifferences are broken through fixed tie-breaking rules (as in Baswana et al. (2018) and Correa et al. (2019)). To the best of our knowledge, our proposed horizontal envelope choice rule is the first choice rule that utilizes the flexibility in reserve matching for an improved design.
- (3)

strategy-proof and obtains a stable matching. However, we can no longer guarantee student-optimality.

Indeed their suggestion of breaking ties arbitrarily to form a strict preference, and applying the resulting choice rule in conjunction with the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm was followed by the research group that have recently designed the Chilean school choice mechanism. What is misleading in their footnote is that, their stability notion fails to allow for schools to utilize the flexibility to move students between different types of reserves to accommodate either higher priority students or to fill a greater number of reserved seats. Therefore, while their stability notion is equivalent to the combination of elimination of justified envy and non-wastefulness for the one-to-all reserve matching convention, it is a weaker notion under the one-to-one reserve matching convention. In particular, when students are indifferent between different seats of a given school, their proposed choice rule fails not only maximal compliance with reservations (see Example 4 in Section 6.1), but also elimination of justified envy (see Example 3 in Section 6.1).

2. Model: Homogeneous Jobs

There exist a set of individuals I and a set of traits T . Each individual $i \in I$ has a set of traits $t(i) \subseteq T$. A trait can specify gender, race, or socioeconomic status of an individual. There are q identical positions to allocate, which may correspond to positions at a job, seats at a school, or seats for legislative organs. Individuals are strictly ranked according to a priority order p . Therefore, $i \succ_p j$ means that individual $i \in I$ has a strictly higher priority than individual $j \in I$. Without loss of generality, we assume that all individuals are eligible for this job.

For every trait t , $r_t \in \mathbb{N}$ number of positions are reserved for individuals with trait t .

Both conventions are used in real-life applications.

3. One-to-One Reserve Matching & Horizontal Envelope Choice Rule

In this section, we adopt the one-to-one reserve matching convention. That is, throughout this section an individual is assumed to accommodate reserves for only one of her traits.

Fix a reservation market $h|I, T, t, p, q, (r_t)_{t \in T} | I$, and consider a set of applicants $I \subseteq I$. Construct the following two-sided **reservation graph**. On one side of the graph, there are individuals in I . On the other side, there are reserved positions, i.e., there is a position for each reservation. Therefore, for each trait t , there are r_t positions and, there are $\sum_{t \in T} r_t$ positions in total. An individual and a position are connected if the individual has the trait of the position and thus they can be matched with each other. A one-to-one matching of individuals with positions **has maximum cardinality in reserve matching** if there exists no other one-to-one matching that assigns strictly higher number of reserved positions to individuals. Let $n(I)$ denote this maximum number of reserved positions that can be assigned to individuals. Say that an individual i **increases reserve utilization of I** , if $n(I \setminus \{i\} \cup \{i\}) = n(I) + 1$.

Definition 1. A set of individuals $I^0 \subseteq I$ **maximally complies with reservations for I** , if, there exists a one-to-one matching of individuals in I^0 to the reserved positions with maximum cardinality $n(I)$ in reserve matching.

A choice rule C **maximally complies with reservations** if, for every set $I \subseteq I$, $C(I)$ maximally complies with reservations for I .

Consider the following **horizontal envelope choice rule**:

Choice Rule C

Step 1.1: Choose the highest priority individual with a trait that has a reserved position. Let i_1 be this individual and I_1 be the set including only this individual. If there exists no such individual, go to Step 2.

Step 1.k ($k \geq [2, \sum_{t \in T} r_t]$): Starting from the individual who has the next highest priority after i_{k-1} , check one by one if the next individual increases reserve utilization of I_{k-1} .⁸ If she does, choose this individual and denote her by i_k . In this case, let $I_k = I_{k-1} \cup \{i_k\}$ be the set of individuals chosen so far. Otherwise, if no such individual exists, go to Step 2.

Step 2: For unfilled positions, choose remaining individuals with the highest priority until all positions are filled or there are no unchosen individuals remaining.

⁸This can be done with various computationally efficient algorithms, see, for example, the bipartite cardinality matching algorithm (Lawler, 2001, Page 195).

When the number of individuals is less than q , this procedure selects all individuals. Otherwise, if there are more than q individuals, then it chooses a set with q individuals.

We illustrate the horizontal envelope choice rule with the following example.

Example 1. Consider the following reservation market:

$$I = \{i_1, i_2, \dots, i_n\}$$




FIGURE 2. Individuals i_2 and i_4 can be matched with different positions in the reservation graph.

dashed matching shown in Figure 2. To be more precise, i_2 can be matched with s_3 , i_4 can be matched with s_2 , and i_5 can be matched with s_1 (see the dotted matching in Figure 3).



FIGURE 3. Individuals i_2 , i_4 , and i_5 can be matched with different positions in the reservation graph.

No remaining individuals can be matched with a reserved position together with i_2 , i_4 , and i_5 , so we go to Step 2. At Step 2, individuals i_1 and i_3 are chosen because there are two vacant positions and they have the highest priority among the remaining individuals. Therefore, $C(I) = \{i_1, i_2, i_3, i_4, i_5\}$.

Our first result shows that the horizontal choice rule C selects higher priority individuals than any other choice rule that maximally complies with reservations.

Proposition 1. *Let C be a choice rule that maximally complies with reservations. Then, for every set of individuals I ,*

$$(1) |C(I)| \geq |C(I)|$$

(2) for every $k \in \{1, \dots, n(C(I))\}$, if i is the individual with the k -th highest priority in $C(I)$ and i^0 is the individual with the k -th highest priority in $C(I)$, then

$$i \succ i^0.$$

Next we extend a standard fairness axiom to the present model.

Definition 2. A choice rule C *eliminates justified envy* if for every $I \in \mathcal{I}$, $i \in C(I)$, and $i^0 \notin C(I)$,

$$i^0 \succ i \Rightarrow n(C(I) \setminus \{i\} \cup \{i^0\}) \leq n(C(I)).$$

In words, if a high-priority individual i^0 is rejected even though a low-priority individual i is chosen, then it must be the case that replacing i with i^0 in the chosen set decreases the number of reserved positions that can be filled. When this condition is violated, we say that there is justified envy, which means that there exist a set of individuals I and two individuals $i, i^0 \in I$ such that

- (1) $i \in C(I)$,
- (2) $i^0 \notin C(I)$,
- (3) $n(C(I) \setminus \{i\} \cup \{i^0\}) > n(C(I))$, and
- (4) $i^0 \succ i$.

Therefore, when there is justified envy, a low-priority individual i can be replaced with a high-priority individual i^0 without decreasing the number of reserved positions that can be filled.

Our next axiom, standard in the analysis of choice rules, is a weak efficiency property.

Definition 3. A choice rule C is *non-wasteful* if for every $I \in \mathcal{I}$,

$$j \in C(I) \Rightarrow \min_{q \in Q} f^q(j) = 1.$$

Equivalently, non-wastefulness requires that an individual is rejected only when all positions are allocated.

We next present one of our main results, a characterization of the horizontal envelope choice rule.

Theorem 1. Consider the one-to-one reserve matching convention. A choice rule maximally complies with reservations, eliminates justified envy, and is non-wasteful if, and only if, it is the horizontal envelope choice rule.

4. One-to-All Reserve Matching with Two Traits

In this section, we adopt the one-to-all reserve matching convention. That is, throughout this section an individual is assumed to accommodate each of the reserves for her traits.

Given the complementarities introduced under this convention, analysis of the model in its full generality is not tractable. Hence, we consider the simplest version of this model with only two traits. This simplified version of the model is still of interest, because it is fairly common in real-life applications. Let $T = \{t_1, t_2\}$ be the set of traits. Suppose that $r_{t_1} = q$ and $r_{t_2} = q$.

Parallel to the analysis in Section 3, we next characterize the class of choice rules that satisfy our three axioms under this alternative reserve matching convention for the case of two traits. However, even for this simplified case, the description of the resulting *paired-admissions choice rules* is fairly involved. While the description and analysis of this class is based on a “brute-force” case-by-case analysis, thus lacking the elegance of the analysis of horizontal envelope choice rule presented in Section 3, it provides us with an opportunity to compare and contrast the two reserve matching conventions considered in our paper. This comparison may be valuable for a real-life design, if there is flexibility to choose between the two conventions. Moreover, despite the “brute-force” description and analysis of paired-admissions choice rules, their structure is still very intuitive and it heavily utilizes the complementarities between groups of individuals.

We have to modify a few definitions under the one-to-all reserve matching convention. Since an individual who has both traits counts against reserved positions for both traits, an outcome under this convention is a many-to-one matching of individuals to reserved (or open) positions, where an individual who has both traits can be matched with a reserved position for each trait. A many-to-one matching of at most q individuals with positions **has maximum cardinality in reserve matching**

denote the number of unfilled reserved positions in excess of the unfilled capacity. At Step 1, $q(1) = q$ and, $r_t(1) = r_t$ for every $t \geq T$.

For a given set of individuals I who are already selected and $i \notin I$, let $d(i|I)$ denote the contribution of individual i to accommodate the unfilled reserved positions in excess of the unfilled capacity. Formally,

$$d(i|I) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } n(I \cup \{i\}) = n(I) + 2 \\ 1, & \text{if } n(I \cup \{i\}) = n(I) + 1 \\ 1, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Therefore, when I is the set of individuals chosen before Step k and i is chosen at Step k , we have

$$\Delta(k+1) = \Delta(k) + d(i|I).$$

Let I be the set of applicants and $I(k)$ denote the set of individuals not chosen prior to Step k . Set $I(1) = I$. Therefore, $I \cap I(k)$ is the set of individuals chosen prior to Step k . The following choice procedure has two phases. At its (main) *individual-admissions phase*, one individual is chosen at each step. Once (and if) the procedure enters its *paired-admissions phase*, on the other hand,

- (1) it will never go back to the individual-admissions phase,
- (2) complementarities become important,
- (3) admissions are carried out in pairs, and
- (4) multiple sets of individuals are identified for the remaining positions.

Each set identified under the paired-admissions phase indicates a group of individuals that can be collectively chosen. Therefore, if the procedure goes on to the paired-admissions phase, it identifies a choice correspondence that has multiple sets of individuals as the outcome. In contrast, if the procedure terminates at its individual admissions round, it produces a unique set of individuals as its outcome. Figure 4 shows how each case in this procedure is determined.

Paired-Admissions Choice Correspondence

At each Step k , consider the set of individuals who are not yet chosen, and choose one or more of them depending on the case below. Terminate the procedure when no individuals or positions remain.

Under all cases with the exception of the last case, only one individual is selected. Under the last case, multiple sets of individuals are identified, each as a possible group to select together. It is due to this last case that the procedure is a correspondence rather than a function.

Individual-Admissions Phase




FIGURE 4. Paired-admissions choice correspondence cases represented as a tree. Each terminal node corresponds to a case at which one or more individuals are chosen.

Case a

(1a) $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ or $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$ or $|I_{t_1}(k)| = 0$ or $|I_{t_2}(k)| = 0$

Choose the highest priority individual i , among those with the highest value of $d(i|n|k)$.

Case b.a

(1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$, $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, $|I_{t_1}(k)| > 0$, and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > 0$

Choose the highest priority individual i , among those with the highest value of $d(i|I \cap I(k))$.

Case b.b

(1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$, $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, $|I_{t_1}(k)| > 0$, and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > 0$

(2b) $\Delta(k) < 0$

Choose the highest priority individual.

Case b.c.a

(1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$, $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, $|I_{t_1}(k)| > 0$, and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > 0$

(2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$

(3a) $|I_{t_1}(k)| > r_{t_1}(k)$ and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > r_{t_2}(k)$

Choose the highest priority individual who has at least one trait.

Case b.c.b

(1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$, $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, $|I_{t_1}(k)| > 0$, and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > 0$

(2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$

(3b) $|I_{t_1}(k)| > r_{t_1}(k)$ and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > r_{t_2}(k)$

Choose the highest priority individual who has trait t_1 .

Case b.c.c

(1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$, $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, $|I_{t_1}(k)| > 0$, and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > 0$

(2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$

(3c) $|I_{t_1}(k)| > r_{t_1}(k)$ and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > r_{t_2}(k)$

Choose the highest priority individual who has trait t_2 .

Case b.c.d.a

(1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$, $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, $|I_{t_1}(k)| > 0$, and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > 0$

(2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$

(3d) $|I_{t_1}(k)| > r_{t_1}(k)$ and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > r_{t_2}(k)$

(4a) the highest priority individual has at least one trait

Choose the highest priority individual.

Case b.c.d.b.a

(1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$, $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, $|I_{t_1}(k)| > 0$, and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > 0$

(2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$

(3d) $|I_{t_1}(k)| > r_{t_1}(k)$ and $|I_{t_2}(k)| > r_{t_2}(k)$

(4b) the highest priority individual has at least one trait

- (1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0, r_{t_2}(k) > 0, jI_{t_1}(k)j > 0, \text{ and } jI_{t_2}(k)j > 0$
- (2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$
- (3d) $jI_{t_1}(k)j > r_{t_1}(k) \text{ and } jI_{t_2}(k)j > r_{t_2}(k)$
- (4b) the highest priority individual has no traits
- (5b) there exists an individual with both traits
- (6a) $r_{t_1}(k) > r_{t_2}(k)$

Choose the highest priority individual who has trait t_1 .

Case b.c.d.b.b.b

- (1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0, r_{t_2}(k) > 0, jI_{t_1}(k)j > 0, \text{ and } jI_{t_2}(k)j > 0$
- (2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$
- (3d) $jI_{t_1}(k)j > r_{t_1}(k) \text{ and } jI_{t_2}(k)j > r_{t_2}(k)$
- (4b) the highest priority individual has no traits
- (5b) there exists an individual with both traits
- (6b) $r_{t_1}(k) < r_{t_2}(k)$

Choose the highest priority individual who has trait t_2 .

Case b.c.d.b.b.c.a

- (1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0, r_{t_2}(k) > 0, jI_{t_1}(k)j > 0, \text{ and } jI_{t_2}(k)j > 0$
- (2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$
- (3d) $jI_{t_1}(k)j > r_{t_1}(k) \text{ and } jI_{t_2}(k)j > r_{t_2}(k)$
- (4b) the highest priority individual has no traits
- (5b) there exists an individual with both traits
- (6c) $r_{t_1}(k) = r_{t_2}(k)$
- (7a) Of the remaining $r_{t_1}(k)$ highest priority individuals with trait t_1 along with the remaining $r_{t_2}(k)$ highest priority individuals with trait t_2 , at least one of them has both traits.

Choose the highest priority individual who has both traits.

Paired-Admissions Phase

Case b.c.d.b.b.c.b

- (1b) $r_{t_1}(k) > 0, r_{t_2}(k) > 0, jI_{t_1}(k)j > 0, \text{ and } jI_{t_2}(k)j > 0$
- (2c) $\Delta(k) = 0$
- (3d) $jI_{t_1}(k)j > r_{t_1}(k) \text{ and } jI_{t_2}(k)j > r_{t_2}(k)$
- (4b) the highest priority individual has no traits
- (5b) there exists an individual with both traits
- (6c) $r_{t_1}(k) = r_{t_2}(k)$

(7b) Of the remaining $r_{t_1}(k)$ highest priority individuals with trait t_1 along with the remaining $r_{t_2}(k)$

$$(2b) \Delta(1) = r_{t_1}(1) + r_{t_2}(1) \quad q(1) = 3 + 4 \quad 8 = 1 < 0.$$

Therefore, the highest priority individual, i_1 , is chosen at the first step.

At Step 2, we are at Case b.c.d.b.b.b because

$$(1b) r_{t_1}(2) = 3 > 0, r_{t_2}(2) = 4 > 0, j|_{t_1}(2)j = 7 > 0, j|_{t_2}(2)j = 7 > 0,$$

$$(2c) \Delta(2) = r_{t_1}(2) + r_{t_2}(2) \quad q(2) = 3 + 4 \quad 7 = 0,$$

$$(3d) j|_{t_1}(2)j = 7 > 3 = r_{t_1}(2), j|_{t_2}(2)j = 7 > 4 = \cancel{r_{t_2}(2)}$$




FIGURE 5. An illustration of the paired-admissions correspondence in Example 2. The individuals selected in the individual-admissions phase are denoted by solid nodes, the individuals selected in the paired-admissions phase are denoted by colored nodes such that individuals in the same pair have the same color, and the individuals who are never selected are represented by hollow nodes.

The main result of this section is the following counterpart to Theorem 1.

Theorem 2. *Consider the one-to-all reserve matching convention. A choice rule maximally complies with reservations, eliminates justified envy, and is non-wasteful if, and only if, it is a paired-admissions choice rule.*

The paired-admissions choice correspondence has two extremal choice rules, each of which favors individuals with certain traits. The first one, $C^{\min \max}$, favors individuals with no traits along with individuals with both traits. To be more specific, at the paired-admissions phase of this selection from the procedure, the maximum number of pairs that include an individual with no traits and an individual with both traits are chosen. Therefore, $q_1 \sqcup \dots \sqcup q_m \sqcup p_1 \sqcup \dots \sqcup p_r \sqcup m$ is the set of individuals chosen at the paired-admissions phase. Similarly, there is a paired-admissions choice rule, $C^{\max \min}$, that favors individuals with exactly one trait. At the paired-admissions phase of this alternative selection from the procedure, this choice rule selects all pairs that have an individual with trait t_1 and an individual with trait t_2 . Therefore, at the paired-admissions phase, the set of individuals chosen is $p_1 \sqcup \dots \sqcup p_r$.

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- (c) For any $I \subseteq I$, the highest priority individual in $I \cap C^{\min \max}(I)$ has a weakly lower priority than the highest priority individual in $I \cap C(I)$.
- (2) Let C be any paired-admissions choice rule.
- (a) For any $I \subseteq I$ and $i \in I$ such that $t(i) = f_{t_1} t(i) = f_{t_2} f$

For any job $j \in J$, the definition of the horizontal envelope choice rule C_j immediately extends to this framework under the one-to-one reserve matching convention. Similarly, assuming there are only two traits, the definition of the paired-admissions choice correspondence also extends under the one-for-all reserve matching convention.

Over the last fifteen years, the following algorithm Gale and Shapley (1962) has become the mechanisms of choice for priority-based allocation with heterogeneous goods, where the policies of the institutions are captured through the choice rules that are used in conjunction with this algorithm.

Agent-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA)

Step 1: Each individual applies to her most preferred acceptable job if such a job exists. Suppose that I_j^1 is the set of individuals who apply to job j . Job j tentatively accepts individuals in $C_j(I_j^1)$ and permanently rejects the rest. If there are no rejections, then stop.

Step k : Each individual who was rejected in Step $k-1$ applies to her next preferred acceptable job, if such a job exists. Suppose that I_j^k is the union of the set of individuals who were tentatively accepted by job j in Step $k-1$, and the set of individuals who just proposed to job j . Job j tentatively accepts individuals in $C_j(I_j^k)$ and permanently rejects the rest. If there are no rejections, then stop.

Extension of our analysis to the case with heterogeneous jobs through DA is straightforward, provided that the choice rule of each job satisfies the following two conditions.¹⁰

Definition 5. (Kelso and Crawford, 1982) A choice rule C satisfies the **substitutes condition**, if, for every $I \subseteq I$,

$$i \in C(I) \text{ and } i^0 \notin i \Rightarrow i \in C(I \setminus i^0).$$

Definition 6. (Aygün and Sönmez, 2013) A choice rule C satisfies the **irrelevance of rejected individuals condition**, if, for every $I \subseteq I$,

$$i \in I \setminus C(I) \Rightarrow C(I \setminus i) = C(I).$$

As the following two results imply, while a joint implementation of the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with the horizontal envelope choice rule is straightforward under the one-to-one reserve matching convention, this is not possible for any paired-admissions choice rule under the one-to-all reserve matching convention.

Proposition 4. The horizontal envelope choice rule C satisfies the substitutes condition and the irrelevance of rejected individuals condition.

Proposition 5. There exists no paired-admissions choice rule that satisfies the substitutes condition.

¹⁰See for example Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) and Aygün and Sönmez (2013).

6. Applications

In this section, we present three large scale practical applications of our model from Chile, India, and Brazil, and present how our proposed mechanism improves upon the mechanisms of choice in these applications.

6.1. School Inclusion Law in Chile. With the promulgation of the School Inclusion Law in Chile in 2015, a centralized school choice system has been in the process of being adopted in Chile, following a similar series of reforms throughout the world (Correa et al., 2019). The system is the product of an ongoing collaboration between the Chilean Ministry of Education and a team of researchers from economics and operations research, and it covers all grades prior to higher education (i.e., Pre-K to grade 12). The system was first implemented in 2016 as a pilot program in the smallest of the sixteen regions of Chile, and it has been adopted in all regions but the Metropolitan Area of Santiago by 2019, where over 274,000 students applied to more than 6400 schools. The system is expected to be adopted throughout Chile in 2020.

As many of its predecessors, the Chilean school choice system is based on the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm, and the following three features in its design make it a perfect application of our model:

- (1) In order to promote diversity, the School Inclusion Law includes affirmative action policies for financially disadvantaged students and children with special needs. Under the new system, these policies are implemented through reserved seats at each school. In addition, a number of schools are allowed to reserve seats for high-achieving students. Hence, using our terminology there are three traits, *Financially disadvantaged*, *Special needs*, *High-achieving*, where a student potentially can have any subset of these traits, possibly including none of them.¹¹
- (2) While a student with multiple traits (say a financially disadvantaged student who is also high-achieving) is eligible for reserved seats for each of her traits, she “consumes” only one of the reserved seats upon receiving a seat. This feature in Chilean design eliminates potential complementarities between the regular students and students with multiple traits.
- (3) Reserved seats at each school are implemented in the form of a *soft lower bound* (i.e., as a minimum guarantee).

A subtle implication of the second design feature is that it allows the model to be interpreted as an application of the *matching with contracts* model of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), where the contractual term between a school and a student specifies which of the four types of seats (i.e., open seats, reserved seats for financially disadvantaged students,

¹¹Students with none of the three traits are referred as *Regular*.

reserved seats for special needs students, and reserved seats for high-achieving students) the student receives, which is studied in Kurata et al. (2017). However, the theory of matching with contracts is developed under the assumption that students have strict preferences over all their contracts, which in this context corresponds to them having strict preferences on the specific type of seats they receive at each school. Since students have preferences over only schools, a tie-breaking rule is used to construct student preferences over specific type of seats at each school. In Correa et al. (2019), the designers emphasize that the choice of a tie-breaking rule is not straightforward, and it has distributional consequences. In order to implement the reserves in the form of a minimum guarantee, they break ties in a way each student is assumed to prefer reserved seats for any of their traits to open seats. When each student has at most one trait, this construction assures that the reserves are implemented as a minimum guarantee (Hafalir et al. (2013), Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a)).¹² However, as we present in the following two examples, interpreting this problem as an application of matching with contracts and relying on tie-breaking between reserved seats results in undesired outcomes.

Example 3. Suppose there is only one school s with three seats. There are four students i_1, i_2, i_3, i_4 who are priority ranked as follows:

$$i_1 \rho_s i_2$$

the reserve seats. Since by the Chilean design each student is also assumed to prefer seats at one of her traits to open seats, this results in the following construction of preferences for the students:

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
 s_0 & i_1 & s_h & i_1 & s_d \\
 s_h & i_2 & s_d & i_2 & s_0 \\
 s_h & i_3 & s_0 & i_3 & s_d \\
 s_d & i_4 & s_0 & i_4 & s_h.
 \end{array}$$

Therefore, under the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, at Step 1 student i_1 applies to the open seat s_0 , whereas students i_2 and i_3 both apply for the reserved seat s_h , and student i_4 applies to the reserved seat s_d . Reserved seat s_h holds student i_2 and rejects student i_3 , whereas the open seat s_0 and the reserved seat s_d each hold their only applicant. At Step 2, student i_3 applies to the open seat s_0 , only to be rejected again since student i_1 who is on hold for the open seat has higher priority for the open seat. Finally at Step 3, student i_3 applies to the reserve seat s_d , and gets rejected for a third time since student i_4 who is on hold for the reserved seat s_d has higher priority for the seat s_d having the financially disadvantaged trait. This results in the following matching

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 & & ! \\
 s_0 & s_h & s_d \\
 i_1 & i_2 & i_4
 \end{array}$$

of students to seats, and hence the set of students admitted to school s are $\{i_1, i_2, i_4\}$. This outcome is undesired for the following reason: Observe that student i_2 has the highest priority at not only seat s_h but also s_d . Therefore, had she not been artificially assumed to prefer seat s_h to s_d , she could have been instead assigned the seat s_d , which in turn would allow student i_3 to receive seat s_h resulting in the matching,

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 & & ! \\
 s_0 & s_h & s_d \\
 i_1 & i_3 & i_2
 \end{array}$$

This alternative outcome is preferred to the outcome of the Chilean system, because it replaces the third priority student i_3 with the fourth priority student i_4 , while still satisfying both reserves. This outcome is indeed the outcome of the horizontal envelope choice rule, which is agnostic about which type of reserved seat an agent receives when she has multiple traits.

The Chilean system induces a choice rule C^{Chile} for any given tie-breaking rule, and in Example 3 the choice rule C^{Chile} uses reservations fully. Hence, by Proposition 1 in Section 4, the choice rule C admits higher priority students than the choice rule C^{Chile}

in all examples where the latter choice rule uses reservations fully. But our next example shows that, in general the choice rule C^{Chile} may fail to use reservations fully.

Example 4. Suppose there is only one school s with three seats. There are four students i_1, i_2, i_3, i_4 who are priority ranked as follows:

$$i_1 \rho_s i_4 \rho_s i_2 \rho_s i_3.$$

One of the seats is reserved for students with trait financially disadvantaged t_d , and one of the seats is reserved for students with trait high-performing t_h . Students i_1, i_4 are both regular students with neither of the traits, whereas student i_2 has both traits, and student i_3 has the financially disadvantaged trait t_d only.

Let s_0 denote the open seat, s_d denote the reserve seat for financially disadvantaged students, and s_h denote the reserve seat for high-achieving students. Hence, student i_2

results in the following matching

$$m = \begin{array}{ccc} s_0 & s_h & s_d \\ i_1 & i_4 & i_2 \end{array}$$

horizontal trait, integrating SCI horizontal subroutine with vertical reservation is straightforward: The subroutine is to be directly applied to each vertical category.¹⁷

However, there are multiple horizontal traits in many applications. For example, horizontal reservation for women is mandated in several states including in Bihar with 35%, Andhra Pradesh with $33\frac{1}{3}\%$, and Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, and Sikkim with 30% each. In many applications, there are other horizontal traits as well, such as ex-servicemen, sportsmen, etc. In those applications, the standard procedure is implementing the SCI horizontal subroutine for each of the horizontal traits. Processing multiple horizontal reservations is also straightforward when each individual is either qualified for at most one horizontal trait, or she is forced to declare at most one horizontal trait. In that case, it is immaterial in what order the adjustments are made via SCI horizontal subroutine. Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a) analyze the Supreme Court's allocation procedure for this case where it is well-defined.

What is analytically more challenging, however, is the case when individuals qualify for

with individuals “using up” a position from only one of the horizontal reservations. Adhering to this interpretation of horizontal reservation, we next present two shortcomings of the practice of sequentially implementing the SCI horizontal adjustment subroutine.¹⁸

Example 5.

Section 4 do not immediately apply to the application for Brazil, we can build on these results to design a class of choice rules since complementarities are restricted to two groups for this application as well.

Even though the Law of Social Quotas requires reserved seats for students with sets of trait fpg , fp , g , and fp,mg , it does not provide any choice rule to implement these reserves. Due to the challenges of implementing overlapping reserves, several universities have adopted choice rules that rely on dividing the reserves given by the law into finer reserves for each combination of traits. Under these rules, there are (non-overlapping) reserves for

- (1) public school graduates who are low income and of black, mixed or indigenous descent,
- (2) public school graduates who are low income but not of black, mixed or indigenous descent,
- (3) public school graduates who are of black, mixed or indigenous descent but not low income, and
- (4) public school graduates who are neither low income, nor of black, mixed or indigenous descent.

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- (a) For any $I \subseteq I$ and $i \in I$ such that $t(i) = fp, \backslash, mg$,
 $i \in (C^{hor} \ C)(I) \Rightarrow i \in (C^{hor} \ C^{min \ max})(I)$.
- (b) For any $I \subseteq I$ and $i \in I$ such that $t(i) = fp, \backslash g$ or $t(i) = fp, mg$,
 $i \in (C^{hor} \ C^{min \ max})(I) \Rightarrow i \in (C^{hor} \ C)(I)$.
- (2) Let C be any paired-admissions choice rule.
- (a) For any $I \subseteq I$ and $i \in I$ such that $t(i) = fp, \backslash g$ or $t(i) = fp, mg$,
 $i \in (C^{hor} \ C)(I) \Rightarrow i \in (C^{hor} \ C^{max \ min})(I)$.
- (b) For any $I \subseteq I$ and $i \in I$ such that $t(i) = fp, \backslash, mg$,
 $i \in (C^{hor} \ C^{max \ min})(I) \Rightarrow i \in (C^{hor} \ C)(I)$.
- (c) For any $I \subseteq I$, the lowest priority individual in $(C^{hor} \ C^{max \ min})(I)$ has a weakly higher priority than the lowest priority individual in $(C^{hor} \ C)(I)$.

Remark 1. For an individual i such that $t(i) = \emptyset$ and $t(i) = fp, g$, there is no preference comparison between $C^{hor} \ C^{min \ max}$ and $C^{hor} \ C^{max \ min}$. For a set of individuals, the highest priority rejected individual by $C^{hor} \ C^{min \ max}$ can have a strictly lower or strictly higher priority than the highest priority rejected individual by $C^{hor} \ C^{max \ min}$.

7. Conclusion

We have presented a theory of overlapping reserves both for the case of one-to-one reserve matching convention and also for the case of one-to-all reserve matching convention when there are complementarities between two groups only. There is a unique natural choice rule that emerges under the first convention, the horizontal envelope choice rule, and, hence, if there is any flexibility to select one of the conventions we believe the case for the one-to-one reserve matching is much stronger. Our results have direct policy implications for a variety of real-life allocation problems, including school choice in Chile, public job allocation in India, and college admissions in Brazil.

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


FIGURE 6. The alternating path between M_1 and M_2 constructed in the proof of Lemma 2. The edges in M_1 are solid and the edges in M_2 are dashed.

$C(I) \setminus C(I)$ has a higher priority than the k -th agent in $C(I) \setminus C(I)$, which implies part 2.

For the base case when there are no reserved positions, statement (2) holds because C chooses individuals with the highest priority at Step 2. Now suppose that the claim holds for all parameters bounded above by $(q, (r_t)_{t \in T})$. Consider parameters $(q, (r_t)_{t \in T})$. If all individuals in $C(I) \setminus C(I)$ are chosen at Step 2, then the claim holds as in the base case because individuals in $C(I) \setminus C(I)$ are available at Step 2 in the construction of $C(I)$.

Consider the situation when there exists at least one individual in $C(I) \setminus C(I)$ chosen at Step 1. Let i be the individual with the highest priority in $C(I) \setminus C(I)$ chosen at Step 1 and t be the trait of the position that she is matched with. By Lemma 3, C maximally complies with reservations, so in the reservation graph, there exists a matching M_1 that matches $C(I)$ to a set of reserved positions S with maximum cardinality $n(I)$. Since C also maximally complies with reservations, by Mendelson-Dulmage Theorem (see Lemma 1) there exists another matching M_2 that matches $C(I)$ to S both of which have cardinality $n(I)$. By Lemma 2, there exists an alternating path that starts at i and ends at an individual $i^\theta \notin C(I) \setminus C(I)$. Therefore, individual i can be replaced with individual i^θ in $C(I)$ without changing the set of positions covered in the reservation graph for I . Hence, by construction of $C(I)$, $i \succ i^\theta$ because i^θ is available when i is chosen at Step 1.

Now consider the reduced market when capacity q and reservation for trait t are both reduced by one and the set of individuals is $\{i \setminus i^\theta\}$. In this reduced market, $C(I \setminus i^\theta, i^\theta g)$ is equal to $C(I) \setminus i^\theta g$ for the original market because $i^\theta \notin C(I)$ and the construction of $C(I \setminus i^\theta, i^\theta g)$ chooses individuals in the same order as they are chosen in $C(I)$. In particular, the set of individuals chosen before i at $C(I)$ are chosen in the same order in $C(I \setminus i^\theta, i^\theta g)$. Furthermore, after i is chosen the set of updated parameters are exactly the same. Therefore, the same set of individuals are chosen in the same order after i is chosen in $C(I)$. In addition, $C(I) \setminus i^\theta g$ maximally complies with reservations and $i \notin C(I) \setminus i^\theta g$.

By the induction hypothesis, the individuals in $C(I, n, f_i, i^0, g)$ and $C(I, n, f_i^0, g)$ can be ordered with the required property, which implies the hypothesis. Therefore, the hypothesis holds for every set of parameters $(q, (r_t)_{t \in T})$.

Proof of Theorem 1. We first show that C satisfies the stated properties in several lemmas and then show that the unique choice rule satisfying these properties is C .

Lemma 3. C maximally complies with reservations.

Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that C does not maximally comply with reservations. Hence, there exists $I \subseteq I$ such that $C(I)$ does not maximally comply with reservations for I . Therefore, in the reservation graph for $C(I)$, the maximum cardinality that can be attained by a matching is strictly less than $n(I)$. Let $\bar{I} \subseteq C(I)$ be the set of individuals who are matched to reserved positions in a maximum matching for the reservation graph for $C(I)$. By construction, $|\bar{I}| < n(I)$. Now consider a maximum matching for the reservation graph for I . Let S be the set of positions matched, so $|S| = n(I)$. By Mendelson-Dulmage Theorem (see Lemma 1), there exists a matching that assigns every individual in \bar{I} and every reserved position in S in the reservation graph of I . But this is a contradiction to the construction of $C(I)$ as this choice rule finds a maximal matching in the reservation graph of I , which implies that there cannot exist another matching that assigns a set of individuals that is a proper superset of $C(I)$ to positions in the reservation graph of I .

Lemma 4. C eliminates justified envy.

Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that C does not eliminate justified envy. Therefore, there exist a set of individuals $I \subseteq I$, individuals $i \in C(I)$, $i^0 \in I \setminus C(I)$ with $n(C(I)) < n(C(I) \cup \{i^0\})$.

construction of C because

$$C(I) = (C(I) \cap \{i\}) \cup \{i\}$$

and $i \succ i$.

Lemma 5. C is non-wasteful.

Proof. C is non-wasteful because at the second step all the unfilled positions are filled with the remaining individuals until all positions are filled or all individuals are assigned to positions.

Lemma 6. If a choice rule maximally complies with reservations, eliminates justified envy, and is non-wasteful, then it has to be C .

Proof. Let C be a choice rule that maximally complies with reservations, eliminates justified envy, and is non-wasteful. Suppose, for contradiction, that $C \neq C$. Therefore, there exists $I \subseteq I$ such that $C(I) \neq C(I)$. Since both choice rules are non-wasteful

$$|C(I)| = |C(I)|.$$

Since $C(I) \neq C(I)$, this equation implies that

$$|C(I) \cap C(I)| = |C(I) \cap C(I)| > 0.$$

We consider two cases depending on the value of $n(I)$.

Case 1: If $n(I) = 0$, then no individual in I has a trait that has a positive reservation. Therefore, $C(I)$ consists of $\min\{j, q\}$ individuals with the highest priority in I . This is a contradiction to the assumption that $C(I)$ eliminates justified envy because any individual $i \in C(I) \cap C(I)$

when i_k is chosen. But this is a contradiction to the assumption that $C(I)$ eliminates justified envy because $i^0 \succ C(I)$, $i_k \succ I \cap C(I)$, $i_k \succ i^0$, and $n(C(I)) = n((C(I) \cap I) \cup (I \setminus C(I)))$. Therefore, $I_1 \subseteq C(I)$.

By construction of $C(I)$, every individual in $C(I) \cap I_1$ is chosen at Step 2. Therefore, these individuals have a higher priority ranking than any individual in $I \cap C(I)$. Let $i^0 \succ C(I) \cap I_1$, which is non-empty by assumption. Therefore, $i^0 \succ I \cap C(I)$, which means that any individual $i \succ C(I) \cap I_1$ has a strictly higher priority than i^0 . This is a contradiction to the assumption that $C(I)$ eliminates justified envy because $i^0 \succ C(I)$, $i \succ I \cap C(I)$, $i \succ i^0$, and $n(C(I)) = n = n((C(I) \cap I) \cup (I \setminus C(I)))$ where the last equation follows from $I_1 \subseteq (C(I) \cap I)$ and the fact that $n(I_1) = n$.

This finishes the proofs of all the statements.

Proof of Theorem 2. We provide a series of lemmas to show each claim separately. Recall that for any Step k , $\Delta(k) = r_{t_1}(k) + r_{t_2}(k) = q(k)$.

Lemma 7. *A paired-admission choice rule is non-wasteful.*

Proof. A paired-admission choice rule is non-wasteful because individuals are chosen until all positions are filled or all individuals are chosen. To be more explicit, in the individual-admissions phase, at every step, an individual is chosen as long as there are remaining individuals and positions, and, furthermore, in the paired-admissions phase all remaining positions are filled.

Lemma 8. *A paired-admission choice rule maximally complies with reservations.*

Proof. Let C be a paired-admission choice rule. Suppose, for contradiction, that it does not maximally comply with reservations. Then there exists a set of individuals I such that $C(I)$ does not have the maximum cardinality of $n(I)$ in the reservation graph. Therefore, at least one reservation for one of the traits, say t_1

be chosen at Step k or after. Therefore, by construction, the priority ranking of \bar{i} is weakly higher than an individual with at least one trait who is chosen when the remaining reservations for both traits are zero and that individual must have a strictly higher priority than i^θ . Furthermore, by construction, i must have a weakly higher priority than \bar{i} since \bar{i} is the last individual with both traits who is chosen. We get a contradiction that i must have a strictly higher priority than i^θ .

- (2) Suppose that there are at most r_{t_2} individuals with trait t_2 in $C(I)$. Then i^θ must also have t_2 because $n((C(I) \text{ n fig}) [\text{fi}^\theta \text{g}) \quad n(C(I))$. Therefore, $t(i^\theta) = \text{ft}_2 \text{g}$. Furthermore, there must be at least $r_{t_1} + 1$ individuals in $C(I)$ who have trait t_1 .

In the last Step K , suppose for contradiction that $r_{t_2}(K) = 1$. Then the last individual to be chosen, say \bar{i} , has trait t_2 . Furthermore, since there are at least $r_{t_1} + 1$ individuals in $C(I)$ with trait t_1 , $r_{t_1}(K) = 0$. This implies that \bar{i} is chosen by Case a and, therefore, this individual has a higher priority than i^θ who also has trait t_2 . If \bar{i} also has trait t_1 , then we get a contradiction because i has a weakly higher priority than \bar{i} . Suppose that \bar{i} does not have trait t_1 . Consider the last individual i with trait t_1 to be chosen. At the step in which i is chosen, the remaining reservations for t_1 is zero. Furthermore, there is a positive number of reservations for t_2 and there is at least one remaining individual with trait t_2 . Therefore, i also has t_2 . But this implies that i has a weakly higher priority than \bar{i} , who in turn has a strictly higher priority than \bar{i} since \bar{i} is available but not chosen. This is a contradiction since \bar{i} has a strictly higher priority than i^θ .

Hence, $r_{t_2}(K) \notin 1$, which implies that $r_{t_2}(K) = 0$ and $\Delta(K) = 1$. If $\Delta(k) < 0$ for every Step k , then we get a contradiction because i must be chosen by Case a for one of the traits which cannot be t_2 because i^θ also has trait t_2 and i^θ has a higher priority than i . If i is chosen by case a because the remaining reservations for t_1 is positive then an individual with trait t_1 is chosen later when there are no remaining reservations for t_1 . Hence this individual has a higher priority than i^θ , which is a contradiction. Therefore, it cannot be that $\Delta(k) < 0$ for every Step k .

Let k be the last step such that $\Delta(k) = 0$, so $\Delta(k) < 0$ for every $k > k$ and $\Delta(k + 1) = 1$. At Step k , $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$, $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, and an individual with both traits must have been chosen so that $\Delta(k + 1) = 1$. Let i be the last individual with both traits who is chosen. Therefore, i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$. If i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, then i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$. If i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$, then i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$. If i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$, then i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$. Therefore, i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$. If i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$, then i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$. If i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$, then i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$. If i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$, then i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) = 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) = 0$. Therefore, i is chosen at a Step k where $r_{t_1}(k) > 0$ and $r_{t_2}(k) > 0$.

because of trait t_2 or when no reservations remain, we get a similar contradiction. However, if i is chosen by Case b.b because he has the highest priority, we get a contradiction because i has a weakly lower priority than i .

Case 2: Consider the case when i does not have trait t_2 , so $t(i) = ft_1g$. We further consider two cases.

- (1) Suppose that there are at least $r_{t_2} + 1$ individuals in $C(I)$ who have trait t_2 . Since $n((C(I) \setminus \{i\}) \cap ft_1g) \geq n(C(I))$, there are also at least $r_{t_1} + 1$ individuals in $C(I)$ who have trait t_1 . Furthermore, when i is chosen, there must be positive reservations for trait t_1 because i^θ is available and not chosen at this step. If the last chosen individual with trait t_1 , say \bar{i} who has to be different from i since there are at least $r_{t_1} + 1$ individuals with trait t_1 in $C(I)$, does not have trait t_2 , then we get a contradiction as this individual must have strictly lower priority than i^θ and there are no remaining reservations for t_1 . If \bar{i} has trait t_2 but there are no remaining reservations for trait t_2 , we get a similar contradiction. Therefore, \bar{i} must have both traits and when she is chosen there are remaining reservations for trait t_2 . Then the last chosen individual with trait t_2 , say i who has to be different than \bar{i} , does not have t_1 and there are no remaining reservations for either trait. We get a contradiction because i has a weakly lower priority than \bar{i} and \bar{i} has a weakly lower priority than i . But i is chosen while i^θ is rejected when there are no remaining reservations, so i must have a strictly higher priority than i^θ .

- (1) Suppose that at the first step of the paired-admission choice correspondence only one individual i is chosen in the individual-admissions phase. Then $i \notin C(I)$ otherwise either $C(I)$ does not maximally comply with the reservations for I or there is an instance of justified envy. Likewise i is in any paired-admission choice rule. Now consider the reduced market when $I \setminus \{i\}$ is the set of individuals, $q - 1$ is the capacity, and positive reservations for a trait is reduced by one if i has that trait. In this reduced reservation market, $C(I \setminus \{i\})$ is non-wasteful, maximally complies with reservations for $I \setminus \{i\}$, and eliminates justified envy. Therefore, by mathematical induction hypothesis, $C(I \setminus \{i\})$ is equal to the outcome of a paired-admission choice rule for the reduced reservation market. Hence, $C(I)$ is equal to the outcome of a paired-admission choice rule for the original reservation market.
- (2) Suppose that at the first step of the paired-admissions choice correspondence, all individuals are chosen at the paired-admissions phase. Thus, $r_{t_1} = r_{t_2} = r > 0$, $v_{t_1}^j, v_{t_2}^j > r$, and $q = 2r$. Furthermore, the highest priority individual does not have any traits and there exists an individual with both traits. Finally, no individual among the r highest priority individuals who have trait t_1 and r highest priority individuals who have trait t_2 has both traits. Let i be the highest priority individual with no traits and i^0 be the highest priority individual with both traits. If $C(I)$ has an individual with no traits, then $i \notin C(I)$ to eliminate justified envy. To maximally comply with reservations, an individual with both traits must also be in $C(I)$. Therefore, $i^0 \notin C(I)$ to eliminate justified envy. Hence, if $C(I)$ has an individual with no traits, then $i, i^0 \in C(I)$. Now, consider the reduced reservation problem with the set of individuals $I \setminus \{i, i^0\}$, capacity $q - 2$, reservations for both traits $r - 1$. Then in the reduced problem, $C(I \setminus \{i, i^0\})$ maximally complies with the reservations, eliminates justified envy, and is non-wasteful. By the mathematical induction hypothesis, $C(I \setminus \{i, i^0\})$ is the outcome of a paired-admission choice rule. Since i, i^0 is selected by one of the paired-admission choice rules in the original reservation problem, we conclude that $C(I)$ is a paired-admission choice rule. The second possibility is that $C(I)$ does not have any individuals with no traits. In this case, $C(I)$ also cannot have any individual with both traits because there are r individuals with trait t_1 only and r individuals with trait t_2 only who have a higher priority than the highest priority individual with both traits. Therefore, $C(I)$ must have all these individuals, which is the outcome of a paired-admission choice rule.

This completes the proof of Theorem 2.

Proof of Proposition 2. Let $I \subseteq I$ be a set of applicants and C a paired-admission choice rule. We prove each statement separately.

Proof of (1a): Let $i \in C(I)$ with $t(i) = \emptyset$ or $t(i) = ft_1, t_2g$. If i is chosen in the individual-admissions phase, $i \in C^{\min \max}(I)$ because the same set of individuals is chosen for every paired-admission choice rule in the individual-admissions phase. However, if i is chosen in the paired-admissions phase, then $i \in C^{\min \max}(I)$ because $C^{\min \max}$ chooses the maximum number of pairs including an individual with no traits and an individual with both traits.

Proof of (1b): Let $i \in C^{\min \max}(I)$ with $t(i) = ft_1g$ or $t(i) = ft_2g$. If i is chosen in the individual-admissions phase, $i \in C(I)$ because the same set of individuals is chosen for every paired-admission choice rule in the individual-admissions phase. However, if i is chosen in the paired-admissions phase, then $i \in C(I)$ because $C^{\min \max}$ chooses the minimum number of pairs including an individual with only trait t_1 and an individual with only trait t_2 .

Proof of (1c): If the paired-admission choice correspondence does not have a paired-admissions phase, then the claim is trivial. Likewise if $|I| = q$, the claim is trivial because there is only one paired-admissions choice rule. Suppose that the correspondence ends at the paired-admissions phase and $|I| > q$. Then the highest priority individual in $I \cap C^{\min \max}(I)$ is either i_{m+1} or j_{m+1} . If $C(I) \notin C^{\min \max}(I)$, the highest priority individual in $I \cap C^{\min \max}(I)$ has a weakly higher priority than i_m^0 . By construction of the correspondence, i_m^0 has a strictly higher priority than both i_{m+1} and j_{m+1} .

Proof of (2a): Let $i \in C(I)$ with $t(i) = ft_1g$ or $t(i) = ft_2g$. If i is chosen in the individual-admissions phase, $i \in C^{\max \min}(I)$ because the same set of individuals is chosen for every paired-admission choice rule in the individual-admissions phase. However, if i is chosen in the paired-admissions phase, then $i \in C^{\max \min}(I)$ because $C^{\max \min}$ chooses the maximum number of pairs including an individual with only trait t_1 and an individual with only trait t_2 .

Proof of (2b): Let $i \in C^{\max \min}(I)$ with $t(i) = \emptyset$ or $t(i) = ft_1, t_2g$. If i is chosen in the individual-admissions phase, $i \in C(I)$ because the same set of individuals is chosen for every paired-admission choice rule in the individual-admissions phase. However, if i is chosen in the paired-admissions phase, then $i \in C(I)$ because $C^{\max \min}$ chooses the minimum number of pairs including an individual with no traits and an individual with both traits.

Proof of (2c): If the paired-admission choice correspondence does not have a paired-admissions phase or if $|I| = q$, then the claim is trivial because there is one paired-admissions choice rule. Suppose that the correspondence ends at the paired-admissions phase and $|I| > q$. Then the lowest priority individual in $C^{\max \min}(I)$ is either i_r or j_r . If $C(I) \notin C^{\min \max}(I)$, then the lowest priority individual in $C(I)$ has a weakly lower priority

we are at Case a and individual i_1 is chosen. Therefore, the algorithm terminates at the individual-admissions phase and chooses f_{i_1, i_3g}

that $i \in (C^{hor} \setminus C)(I)$ because the number of positions that are filled in the second step are the same for both choice rules and the number of individuals with a priority lower than i that are admitted at the first step are weakly higher in $(C^{hor} \setminus C^{minmax})(I)$ than that in $(C^{hor} \setminus C)(I)$.

Proof of (2a): Let $i \in (C^{hor} \setminus C)(I)$ with $t(i) = fp, \setminus g$ or $t(i) = fp, mg$. If $i \in C(I)$, then $i \in C^{maxmin}(I)$ by Proposition 2, which implies that $(C^{hor} \setminus C^{maxmin})(I) = \emptyset$. Likewise if $i \in C^{maxmin}(I)$, then we get $(C^{hor} \setminus C^{maxmin})(I) = \emptyset$. Suppose that $i \notin C^{maxmin}(I)$ and $i \notin C(I)$. Then i must have been chosen at the second step of $C^{hor} \setminus C$ and all individuals with a higher priority than i must also be in $(C^{hor} \setminus C)(I)$. Since $i \notin C^{maxmin}(I)$, this implies $C^{maxmin}(I) \subsetneq (C^{hor} \setminus C)(I)$. Therefore, $i \in (C^{hor} \setminus C^{maxmin})(I)$ because there must be enough capacity at the second step of $C^{hor} \setminus C^{maxmin}$ because $C^{hor} \setminus C^{maxmin}(I)$ does not have any pairs including low-priority individuals with the set of traits fp, \setminus, mg whereas $C(I)$ may have some.

Proof of (2b): Let $i \in (C^{hor} \setminus C^{maxmin})(I)$ with $t(i) = fp, \setminus, mg$. If $i \in C^{maxmin}(I)$, then $i \in C(I)$ by Proposition 2, which implies $i \in (C^{hor} \setminus C)(I)$. Suppose that $i \notin C^{maxmin}(I)$, then i must have been chosen at the second step of $(C^{hor} \setminus C^{maxmin})(I)$, and all individuals with a higher priority than i must also be in $(C^{hor} \setminus C^{maxmin})(I)$.